Abstract. This paper presents the first results on AIDA/cube, algebraic and sidechannel attacks on variable number of rounds of all members of the KATAN family of block ciphers. Our cube attacks reach 60, 40 and 30 rounds of KATAN32, KATAN48 and KATAN64, respectively. In our algebraic attacks, we use SAT solvers as a tool to solve the quadratic equations representation of all KATAN ciphers. We introduced a novel pre-processing stage on the equations system before feeding it to the SAT solver. This way, we could break 79, 64 and 60 rounds of KATAN32, KATAN48, KATAN64, respectively. We show how to perform side channel attacks on the full 254-round KATAN32 with one-bit information leakage from the internal state by cube attacks. Finally, we show how to reduce the attack complexity by combining the cube attack with the algebraic attack to recover the full 80-bit key. Further contributions include new phenomena observed in cube, algebraic and side-channel attacks on the KATAN ciphers. For the cube attacks, we observed that the same maxterms suggested more than one cube equation, thus reducing the overall data and time complexities. For the algebraic attacks, a novel pre-processing step led to a speed up of the SAT solver program. For the side-channel attacks, 29 linearly independent cube equations were recovered after 40-round KATAN32. Finally, the combined algebraic and cube attack, a leakage of key bits after 71 rounds led to a speed up of the algebraic attack.
Introduction
bit sizes and the indices x i and y j of L 1 and L 2 ).
where IR is the output of an LFSR i.e. L 1 [x 5 ] is used whenever IR = 1. The values of IR for each round is specified in [13] . For the i-th round, k a = k 2i and k b = k 2i+1 that is, only two key bits are used per round. The output of each of these functions is loaded to the least significant bits (LSB) of the other LFSR, after they are left-shifted. This operation is performed in an invertible manner.
For KATAN48, f a and f b are each applied twice per round, so that the LFSR's are clocked twice (but the same pair of key bits are reused). For KATAN64, each Boolean function is applied three times per round, again with the same pair of key bits reused three times. The selection of bits x i and y i in f a and f b are listed in Table 1 . In this report, plaintext 14 9 and ciphertext bits are numbered in right-to-left order starting from 0. Thus, for instance, a plaintext block for KATAN32 will be numbered as p = (p 31 , . . ., p 0 ). The key schedule algorithm of all KATAN ciphers is a linear mapping that expands an 80-bit key K to 508 subkey bits according to After r rounds, at most 2 * r key bits are mixed with the internal state since two key bits are xored per round. Thus, at least 40 rounds are needed before complete key diffusion for any KATAN cipher is achieved. Further details about these ciphers can be found in [13] .
For analyses purposes, the numbering of the key bits in the user key in our attacks is K = (K 79 , . . ., K 0 ).
Algebraic Attacks Using SAT Solvers
Algebraic cryptanalysis is a type of cryptographic attack that relies on solving a multivariate polynomial representation of a given cipher or hash function. It was initially formulated as early as 1949 by Shannon [29] . Algebraic attacks, since the controversial paper of [11] , have been applied to several stream ciphers [1, 9, 10] and is able to break some of them but it has not been successful in breaking real-life block ciphers, except Keeloq [7, 21] . Compared to statistical analysis, such as linear and differential cryptanalysis, algebraic attacks require a comparatively small number of text pairs. The adversary formulates the cipher as a polynomial multivariate system of equations. This representation is usually over small finite fields like GF(2). This system of equations is often sparse, since efficient implementations of real-world systems require a low gatecount. In the subsequent stage, the adversary solves the system. The problem of solving such system is NP hard in general and is recognized as the MQ problem. An instance of an MQ problem is a set of functions f 1 (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = y 1 , f 2 (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = y 2 , . . . , f m (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = y m where f i can always be converted to a quadratic polynomial by introducing new variables. Notice that n is the number of variables and m is the number of equations. Let c = m n denote the degree of "overdefinition" of a system [4] . Hence, c = 1 denotes exactly a defined system, c > 1 an overdefined system and c < 1 an underdefined system. The polynomial representation of most block ciphers are overdefined or if not then c ≈ 1. It turned out that the more the system is overdefined and sparse the easier it is to be solved [11] . For one instance of KATAN cipher, c < 1. This because in all versions, the key size is larger than the block size. Thus, more than one pair is required to find the correct key.
There are multiple methods for solving such systems. The traditional method uses the Gröbner basis approach such as Buchberger [6] or F4 [20] and F5 [19] algorithms. The drawback of such methods is memory, implying that after a while the algorithm outputs the result or it crashes due to running out of memory. This is true particularly for large systems, but they are usually faster than other methods for small systems and when the characteristic of field q is not 2. When q = 2, more efficient methods were proposed, such as converting these equations to Boolean expressions in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) [4] and deploying various SAT-solver programs. Other strategies include the XL family [12, 11] , the recent MutantXL [15, 25] , ElimLin [8] and the Raddum-Semaev [27] algorithms. We focus on SAT-solver based methods in this paper. From now on we will work only with the field GF(2). To solve such polynomial system by SAT solvers, the attacker initially converts the system from Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) to CNF. There is an efficient conversion method due to Bard-Courtois-Jefferson [4] . We also use a direct method which we call "local interpolation". Let assume that the total degree of the equations is at most 6. We proceed as follows:
-If there are equations which contain more than 6 variables, split these long XORs into several shorter XORs with at most 6 variables, by adding extra variables, for example abc + de f + gh = 1 becomes abc + de f = x and x + gh = 1. -for each equation, convert the Boolean function to CNF and write it explicitly.
The concatenation of these CNFs gives a file with extension .cnf on which we can apply any SAT solver. The magic number 6 originates from [4] , and is called the cutting number-sometimes 4, 5, or rarely 7 is optimal instead.
The area of SAT Solving has seen tremendous progress over the last years. Many problems (e.g. in hardware and software verification) and in our application in cryptanalysis that seemed to be completely out of reach a decade ago can now be handled routinely. Besides, new algorithms and better heuristics, refined implementation techniques turned out to be vital for this success. New SAT solvers can now solve large systems in reasonable time. Since 2002, almost each year a SAT Race competition [28] was established. In 2007 and 2010 respectively, MiniSat [18] and CryptoMiniSat [26] won the Gold prizes. We used these two SAT solvers in our analysis but since the timings of MiniSat were faster, we do not report CryptoMinisat results in this paper.
Straightforward Algebraic Attack on KATAN Using SAT Solvers
One instance of KATAN32 can be represented as 8620 very sparse quadratic equations with 8668 variables, KATAN48 as 24, 908 equations and 24, 940 variables and KATAN64 as 49, 324 equations and 49, 340 variables. As can be observed, the system is underdefined. That is because the key size is larger than block size for all versions. To have a defined or an overdefined system, we need multiple samples.
A summary of our results is in Table 4 . We used the "guess and determine" algebraic attack initially proposed in [4] . This implies that we fix t bits of the key and then we show that recovering the other 80 − t bits is faster than exhaustive search. This is represented in the column titled "Fixed" in Table 4 . In fact, we fix t LSB of the key, since heuristically we obtained better results than fixing the t MSB of the key. We used the graph partitioning method by Wong and Bard [31] to derive the best state variables to fix, but it did not bring about anything better than using the heuristic of fixing the least t significant bits of the key. Note, if we fix t bits, the algebraic attack is solving a system of equations to recover the 80 − t remaining bits.
We represent the time complexity of the SAT Solver (MiniSat) in seconds using a 3 Ghz CPU. Note that our algebraic attacks are in the chosen-plaintext scenario, except in some rare cases as noted. We noticed that chosen-plaintext attack is much stronger against KATAN family than known-plaintext (KP) attack. In our attacks, we followed the following structure for the chosen plaintexts for KATAN32: p i+1 = ((p i ≫ 19) + 1) ≪ 19 and p i+1 = ((p i ≫ 29) + 1) ≪ 29 for KATAN48 and p i+1 = ((p i ≫ 39) + 1) ≪ 39 for KATAN64 for i ≥ 1, where p i is the i-th plaintext we pick and p 1 can be arbitrary. Note that bits 19, 29, 39 are exactly bit 0 of L 1 register for KATAN32, KATAN48 and KATAN64 respectively. This choice of the bits makes the SAT solver run faster. Moreover, we believe it is fair to assume each round encryption of KATAN takes at least 3 CPU cycles. This yields a comparison between the complexity of our attacks and exhaustive key search.
Deploying the straightforward method of converting ANF to CNF and then feeding it to a SAT solver, we could break up to 75 rounds of KATAN32 and 64 rounds of KATAN48 and 60 rounds of KATAN64. But, we can do better by performing a preprocessing on the system of equations before applying it to a SAT solver. Using this pre-processing (see next section), we could break 79 rounds of KATAN32. We only tried this method on KATAN32 equations. Further research would apply this technique to other members of the family.
The Pre-processing SAT-Solver Attack
In this attack, we use the equations generated as described earlier and solve them with the SAT solver MiniSat [18] . It is simpler to formulate KATAN as a sparse system. But, this may not be the best representation for a SAT solver. One characteristic of these equations is that there are many of them with the form x = y, as well as x = 0, y = 1 and more rarely x + y = 1. Also, in a typical example (78 rounds, 45 key bits fixed and 20 CPs of KATAN32) there are 51,321 total equations. Naturally one wants to take advantage of these special equations, during pre-processing, to create a smaller system which has fewer variables and equations.
More precisely, the four heuristics of a CNF problem are (1) the number of variables, (2) the number of clauses, (3) the average number of symbols per clause, and (4) the total number of symbols in the system. The pre-processing algorithm that we describe in the next section is designed on the principle of primarily reducing (1) and (2) while causing the minimum possible increase in (3) and (4). To be specific, at each iteration, a substitution will be made and this substitution reduces (1) and (2) by one, and the substitution is selected in the style of the "greedy algorithm" using (4) as the criterion.
The following pre-processing algorithm, due to Bard, is a refinement of the "massaging" algorithm of [4] and so we call it "turbo-massage". Starting with the equations that were generated, we ran the pre-processing algorithm; after that, we converted the polynomials into a CNF problem, according to [4] and ran MiniSat on that CNF problem to get a solution. We will explain the pre-processors here and refer the reader to [4] or [3] for the process of converting a polynomial system into a CNF problem.
The Turbo-Massage Pre-processing Algorithm
As described before, the equations can be thought of as a series of polynomials f 1 (x) = 0, f 2 (x) = 0, . . .. We define the operation "fully-substitute" as follows: Let f (x) be a polynomial with some monomial µ. To fully-substitute f (x) into g(x) on µ means to
, which is mathematically equivalent, because in any satisfying solution x, we would have µ = h 3 (x). -By clever use of data structures, this can be made highly efficient.
Observe that for the four common forms: x = y, as well as x = 0, y = 1, and more rarely x + y = 1, the "fully-substitute" definition does what one would do if solving a system of equations with a pencil and paper. For more higher weight f (x), understanding what it does to g(x) is more complex.
We must also use a non-standard definition of the weight of a polynomial f (x). We define it to be the number of monomials in f (x), but excluding the constant +1 from the tabulation. The reason for this is that if f (x) has weight w according to this modified definition, then 2 w−1 conjunctive normal form clauses of length w will be required to represent the polynomial, assuming all the monomials are already defined. The total number of symbols is then w2 w−1 and so minimizing w is crucial in keeping the CNF problem small and thus solvable. We now perform the following algorithm:
-INPUT: A system of polynomial equations over GF(2), and a weight-limit w max .
-Mark all polynomials "unused." -While the set of unused polynomials is not empty do:
• Locate the lowest weight unused polynomial f (x).
• If f (x) exceeds w max , terminate.
• Mark f (x) as "used."
• If f (x) has weight 1, then select µ to be the only monomial in f (x).
• If f (x) has weight 3 or higher, select µ to be the monomial which appears least frequently in the entire system of equations.
• If f (x) has weight exactly 2, select µ to be the monomial which appears most frequently in the entire system of equations.
• For any polynomial g(x) containing the monomial µ, simply "fully-substitute"
The "turbo-massaging" algorithm will always terminate, because eventually every polynomial has been marked used. In practice, it will terminate early, where all unused polynomials are of weight w max or higher. If there are n "used" polynomials, then there will be n monomials which appear nowhere in the entire system except in exactly one polynomial. This is, of course, the monomial µ which was chosen when that polynomial was getting used. In our system of equations, it was almost always the case (by an overwhelming margin) that µ was degree one. And so, each used polynomial effectively amputates one variable from the polynomial system of equations.
The special case of weight 2 deserves explanation. When f has weight 1, there is no decision to be made, but it is noteworthy that the weight of g will decrease. When f has weight 2, then the weight of g will not change during the "fully-substitute" operation, except in some odd cases like substituting x = y into zx + zy + w + x + y = 0, where the weight goes from 5 to 1 instantly. Since the weight is not likely to change and we are eliminating a monomial, it makes sense to eliminate a common monomial. When the weight of f is 3 or more, then the weight of g will increase. If we choose µ to be very popular, appearing k times, then the total weight of the system will increase by k(w− 2). Thus, it makes sense to keep the weight growth bounded and choose µ to be rare. This heuristic was found after an enormous number of iterations of "trial-and-error."
For example, in the 78-round, 20 CP, 45-bit-key case of KATAN32, the weight went from 110, 726 to 101, 516 after 47, 032 polynomials got used. Furthermore, the "fully substitute" function was called 330, 587 times. There were 50, 033 equations at this point, down from 51, 321, representing 1, 288 equations that became 0 = 0. In other words, the original system was not full rank. The average weight of a polynomial, using the modified definition of weight, was roughly 2.02898. The system had 53, 993 distinct monomials, plus 2, 005 variables which appeared only in degree 1 monomials, and ended with a CNF problem of 55, 398 variables, and 156, 010 clauses. The conversion process, which must be run only once and not 2 45 times, takes between 20 and 29 minutes in all the cases explored here.
It should be noted that in other polynomial systems it might be the case that µ is often quadratic or higher degree. It remains open if one should force µ to be linear when possible. This is a question that the authors hope to investigate shortly. As it comes to pass, w max = 2 turned out to be slightly better than w max = 3 for this problem, but in other cases up to w max = 5 has been used.
A minor note for algebraic geometers familiar with the concept of a Macaulay matrix [23] in the Lazard [22] family of algorithms (including F4 [20] , XL and their variants [12, 11] ) is that this algorithm is like a Gaussian Elimination on that matrix, but stopping early. The pivoting strategy used is reducible to the Markowitz pivoting algorithm [24] . However, the "fully-substitute" is not the same in this case, as adding x = y to zx + zy + w + x + y = 0 would result in zx + zy + w = 0. On the other hand, fullysubstituting x = y into zx + zy + w + x + y = 0 would result in zx + zx + w + x + x = 0 which turns into w = 0. As you can see, full-substitution is distinct from adding, and is very similar to what a mathematician would do if solving a system of polynomial equations with a pencil and paper.
Results
The first result was 76 rounds, 20 CP and 45 (fixed) key bits of KATAN32, broken faster than by brute force. To extend this result, we explored using fewer key bits, and more rounds. First we conducted the above process for 20 CPs, and for 76, 77, 78, 79 and 80 rounds. Every case was run 50 times.
Because we fixed 45 bits of the key, and so assuming one nano-second per round for a brute force attacker, our attack against r rounds is faster than brute force if and only if it runs in t seconds with 2 45 t < r2 80 10 −9 or more plainly t < r2 35 10 −9 ≈ r(34.3597 · · ·). We also ran trials with 43 bits of the key fixed for 76 rounds and there the threshold would be 4 times greater or 137.439r seconds and for 41 bits of the key 549.755r seconds.
The running times are given in Table 2 . Observe the enormous variance in each trial. In some cases, the fastest run is 1000× faster than the slowest. This is very typical in SAT-solver-based cryptanalysis. We excluded the three fastest and slowest trials and took the mean and standard deviation of the remaining 44 trials.
The running time of 2 45 executions, all added together, is the sum of 2 45 samples from independent random variables. Therefore, the central limit theorem applies and regardless of the actual distribution of running times, if the mean is m 1 and stdev is σ 1 , the sum of 2 45 of them will be normally distributed and have a mean of 2 45 m 1 and a standard deviation of 2 22.5 σ 1 . Since σ/m is an important instrument in gauging the reliability of a normal sample, it is interesting to note here that σ/m (for the sum of 2 45 execution times) would be 2 −22.5 (σ 1 /m 1 ) which is phenomenally tiny. Thus, the running time of the real-world attacker would be essentially constant.
Notice, that we claim that the 2 45 running times are independent, but we do not claim that they are identically distributed. On the other hand, one could conceive of a cipher where one key bit was ignored by the cipher, in which case the running times for two keys which differ only in that bit would be highly dependent. These cases are of pedagogical interest only, because no cipher designer would ever do that.
As can be seen in Table 2 , we are between 80.75 and 2.39 times faster than brute force search for up to and including 79 rounds. In the case of 80 rounds, out of 50 trials, 29 of them timed-out after 1 hour. Since this is majority, it is not possible that the mean is less than the required 2748.77 seconds, and so we are not faster than brute-force for 80 rounds. For 43 key bits and 41 key bits, the attack becomes vastly more efficient.
But, we cannot test 39 key bits, as the time-out value would have to be set to 167,125 seconds or roughly 46 hours, for each of 50 processes.
In addition to MiniSat, we ran all 50 instances with CryptoMiniSat [26] , a SATSolver constructed specifically for cryptography by Mate Soos. However, it was consistently slower than MiniSat. We suspect that this is the case because CryptoMiniSat was intended to minimize the impact of long-XORs, which are normally very damaging to the running time of SAT-solver methods; however, we have no long-XORs in our equations, in fact, no sum was longer than 5 symbols after pre-processing, excluding the constant monomial.
The Gibrat Hypothesis
In [4] , [8] as well as [3] , Bard hypothesized that the true distribution of the running times of a CNF-problem in a polynomial-system-based SAT problem follows the Gibrat distribution. That is to say, that the logarithm of the running time is normal. The running times here were such that their standard deviations exceeded the mean. If the distribution of the running time were normal, having σ > µ would imply a very significant fraction of the running times would be negative. Therefore, it is not possible that the running time is normally distributed. On the other hand, we also tabulated the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm.
The ratio of the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm of running times is much more reasonable. The kurtosis is the typical measurement of the "normalness" of a distribution and the kurtosis of the logarithms of the running times are far closer to 1 (and are in fact within ±1) than the kurtosis of the running times themselves (which had kurtoses over 9). So the hypothesis that the running times are Gibrat, from [4] , seems well-justified for these examples.
A Strange Phenomena
We were perplexed to discover that solving 77 rounds was far easier than solving 76 rounds or 78 rounds. Therefore, we ran the experiments again, with both sets of results listed in the Table 2 as first batch and second batch. As you can see, in both cases, 77 rounds is much easier than 76 or 78-and with a very large margin. Moreover, this remained true as well in our experiments with CryptoMiniSat. As random variables, the ith iteration of the 76 round attack and the ith iteration of the 77 round attack had absolute correlation of 0.060419 · · · and likewise between 77 and 78 it was −0.09699 · · ·. These extremely low correlations make it safe to hypothesize that the running times are independent and this removes the possibility that the effect is an artifact of some methodology error. Note, the formula for correlation that we used is
as is standard. Moreover, we observed the same behaviour when dealing with the size of the vertex separator in the variable-sharing graph representation of polynomial system of equations of KATAN32 using the strategy described in [31] . For KATAN32, the size of vertex separator is not increasing with the number of rounds and as a matter of fact it fluctuates. We offer no explanation as to the cause of the weakness of the 77-round version of KATAN32.
AIDA/Cube attacks
AIDA/cube attacks [16] are generic key-recovery attacks that can be applied to cryptosystems in a black-box setting, that is, the internal structure of the target cipher is unknown. An important requirement is that the output from the cryptosystem can be represented as a low-degree decomposition multivariate polynomial in Algebraic Normal Form (ANF), called master polynomial, in the key and the plaintext. This attack does not depend on the knowledge of the master polynomial, which may be dense, or whose representation is so large that it cannot even be stored. Let p(x 1 , . . . , x n , v 1 , . . . , v m ) denote a master polynomial over GF(2) in ANF, with x i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the public variables (plaintext, IV bits) and v j the secret key variables. We assume the adversary is allowed to query the master polynomial at values x i (that is, a chosen-plaintext, chosen-IV setting) of its choice (these are also called tweakable parameters) and obtain the resulting bit from the master polynomial. This way, the adversary obtains a system of polynomial equations in terms of secret variables only. The ultimate goal of the attack is to solve this system of equations, which reveals the key variables v j . For this attack, the master polynomial is decomposed as follows:
where t I is a monomial containing only public variables from an index set I ⊂ {1, 2, . . ., n} called cube or hypercube; '+' stands for bitwise xor; p S(i) is called the superpoly of I in p. The superpoly of I in p does not contain any common variable with t I and each monomial in q does not contain at least one variable from I, since they have all been factored out in p S(I) . The p S(I) of interest are linear mappings in terms of v j 's. Any t I that leads to a linear p S(I) in key bits is called maxterm. The output of the offline phase of the attack consists of linear equations in the user key bits directly. Further, Gaussian elimination allows one to reconstruct the user key (independent of the key schedule algorithm). For instance, let
Let I = {1, 2}, so that t I = x 1 .x 2 and we have the following decomposition
The main motivation for this decomposition of the master polynomial is that the symbolic sum over GF(2) of all evaluations of p by assigning all possible binary values to the variables in I (and a fixed value, usually 0, to all the public variables not in I) is exactly p S(I) , the superpoly of t I in p. This is the fundamental theorem in [16] . In the example,
since t I = 0 whenever either of x 1 , x 2 is zero. In q, since each monomial does not contain at least one of the variables in t I , each monomial will appear an even number of times in the summation of p and the xor sum will be zero.
The cube attack has a pre-processing (offline) and an online phase. In the former, the aim is to find monomials t I 's that lead to linear superpolys. The maxterms are not key dependent, so they need to be computed only once per master polynomial, for a fixed number of rounds. For each maxterm, the adversary computes the coefficients of the v j 's, effectively reconstructing the ANF of the superpoly of each t I . This step is performed by linearity tests [5] . The main issue in the pre-processing is to find the correct combination of |I| public variables (out of n) x i that result in linear superpolys. Since the exact form of the master polynomial is unknown, this step is heuristic and consists in randomly choosing the cube variables and using linearity tests to check the superpolys. This phase is performed only once for a given cipher and a fixed number of rounds.
Besides the linearity tests there are also 'constant' tests that are used to determine the constant terms 0 or 1 in the superpoly's. The public variables not in the maxterms should be set to the same fixed value in both phases. After a sufficient 5 number of linearly independent (LI) superpolys have been found, the online phase starts by evaluating the superpolys, that is, summing up p over all the values of the corresponding maxterm, encryptions will be needed to recover each superpoly. On the other hand, if the key size is k bits, then 2 k−t encryptions shall be enough to recover the remaining unknown part of the key. In total, the time complexity In all our cube attacks, we ran 10, 000 linearity tests and then we tested the equations for 50 distinct random keys to be sure they are correct. Table 9 shows cubes and maxterms for 30-round KATAN48. Out of 33 maxterms, six of the have degree 14, nine have degree 13 and eighteen have degree 12. The data complexity is 6 · 2 14 + 9 · 2 13 + 18 · 2 12 = 2 17.90 CP. The memory cost is negligible. Since two subkey bits are used per round, at most 60 key bits are used across 30 rounds. The computational complexity is 2 17.90 + 2 60−33 ≈ 2 27 30-round KATAN48 computations, which is dominated by the exhaustive search for the remaining 27 key bits. 
Cube Attack on KATAN32

Cube Attack on KATAN48
Cube Attack on KATAN64
Combining Cube and Algebraic Attacks
The bottleneck in cube attacks is that after some rounds, the degree of maxterms becomes large. Therefore, it takes a long time to find a linear superpolynomial. But still, if we even get a few linear superpolynomials, it would help to reduce the complexity of the classical algebraic attack. In fact, the overall complexity would be the sum of those two complexities. For a small number of rounds, algebraic attacks are successful, but for larger number of rounds it becomes slower. In such cases, the result of cube attacks and classical algebraic attacks can be combined. For instance, observing Table 4 , we have obtained a 3-bit condition on the key bits for 71-round KATAN32 using cube attacks with time complexity 2 29.58 . The complexity of algebraic attack alone is 2 66.60 . Binding these two attacks reduces the complexity of algebraic attack by 1/8 because it reduces the number of keys to be guessed from 35 to 32. In fact, we need to guess 3 bits less in order to get the same complexity. So, in Table 4 , this reduces our complexity to 2 63.60 .
Side-Channel Attack for Full-Round KATAN32
In this section we consider side-channel attack models such as [17] in which internal cipher data leaks after r rounds, where r < 254, of some full-round KATAN cipher. On one hand, such data is supposed to have been independently captured by some side channels for instace, power or timing analysis or electromagnetic emanations (which is a strong assumption). On the other hand, for our attack setting, only one bit of the cipher state is needed.
The position of the internal cipher data that leaks is selected by the adversary such that its polynomial representation has low degree d and it can be regarded as ciphertext bit c j after r rounds. Unlike [17] , though, we consider c j to be error free, that is, noisefree. Cube attacks are further employed to derive information on the key from c j . In this setting, the same bit c j is supposed to be accessible after each encryption of 2 d CP by the adversary. The adversary chooses different cubes in order to obtain new equations from c j , all of which are mutually linearly independent.
In this model, only very few internal cipher bits are allowed to leak. In our case, only a single internal bit will be used. Assume one can get the value of internal bit c 19 after 40 rounds (c.f. Table 3 ). We can recover 29 key bits via cube attack with data complexity 10 · 2 12 + 2 15 + 2 · 2 16 + 2 18 + 3 · 2 19 + 12 · 2 20 = 2 23.80 CP. The remaining key bits are recovered by brute force. This brings about the time complexity of 2 51 encryptions to attack the full 254-round KATAN32.
Conclusions
This paper described algebraic, AIDA/cube and side-channel attacks on the KATAN family of block ciphers [13] . A new feature observed in cube attacks is that the same maxterms suggests more than one linear independent equation on the key bits. This phenomenon leads to a reduction in the data complexity of our attacks.
For algebraic attacks, deploying pre-processing step on the system of equations before feeding it to the SAT solvers decreases the complexity of the attack for KATAN32. As topic for further research, this method can be tried on other family members.
In the side-channel attack for KATAN32, we observed significant leakage from bit 19 after 40 rounds. More specifically, we could recover 29 linear independent equations on the key bits. Surprisingly enough, this bit position is exactly the LSB of register L 1 . This finding is similar to the structure of chosen plaintexts picked in attacking various versions using SAT solvers (Sect. 3.1). We leave similar side-channel analysis of KATAN48 and KATAN64 as future work. Table 9 . Maxterms, cube degree and equations and ciphertext bit for 30-round KATAN48.
